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CURRENT CASE
Forry, Inc. v. Neundorfer, Inc., 837 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1988)
In FORRY, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit interprets
the requirement of "reasonable efforts" to cure lack of notice under
17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) of the Copyright Act which can prevent for-
feiture of a copyright. The court held that the copyright owner of a
computer program used in an automatic voltage control device
complied with the reasonable efforts requirement by adding notice
to all copies which were subsequently distributed to the public after
the lack of notice was discovered. FORRY represents an adoption of
the Ninth1 and Fourth Circuits'2 interpretations of "reasonable ef-
forts" and a rejection of the Fifth Circuit's3 interpretation which
requires owners to locate and add notice to copies already distrib-
uted to the public. As it affirmed the lower court's grant of a pre-
liminary injunction, the court in FORRY also ruled that whether
"(c)" is sufficient notice under 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(1) of the Copy-
right Act, instead of "©," is an issue to be determined at trial and
not a per se bar to a copyright infringement action. The president
of the plaintiff company, Elliot Drysdale, had designed a rapper
control4 for the defendants in the mid-1970's. The parties had an
arrangement where Drysdale would manufacture the rapper control
devices and the defendant would sell them to its customers. Drys-
dale later incorporated as Drysdale, Inc. and entered into an agree-
ment where Neundorfer, Inc. would act as exclusive sales agent for
the rapper devices.
In 1984, Neundorfer sued Drysdale, Inc. for breach of contract
and other state unfair competition claims. Drysdale, Inc. re-
sponded with a similar countersuit. However, the parties signed a
Settlement Agreement on October 30, 1984, which provided for a
mutual release "from any and all claims" between the parties. In
April 1985, Forry Inc., another Drysdale corporation, was merged
1. Lifshitz v. Walter Drake & Sons, Inc., 806 F.2d 1426, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986).
2. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 441, 444 (4th Cir. 1986).
3. Canfield v. Ponchatoula Times, 759 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1983).
4. "A rapper control is a device used to dislodge dust particles from the collecting
places in an electrostatic precipitor (ESP). ESP's are used in industries where fossil fuels are
burned, utilities, cement factories and upper industries, to collect potential polluntants (dust
particles) before they are emitted into the atmosphere." 837 F.2d 259, 261 n.1.
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into Drysdale, Inc., the surviving corporation which changed its
name to Forry, Inc.
In 1980 or 1981, Drysdale and a microprocessor specialist,
Mecklenburg, had developed an automatic voltage control ("AVC")
which was used in the rapper control. The computer program for
the AVC, the subject of this lawsuit, was finished in 1983 and regis-
tered in 1984.
Neundorfer, Inc. began to market its own AVC just before the
settlement was reached in 1984. Drysale discovered this after the
settlement was finalized. Drysdale filed this suit after he obtained
and examined a Neundorfer AVC and concluded that Neundorfer,
Inc.'s AVC was infringing the plaintiff's copyright.
On appeal, Neundorfer, Inc. challenged the preliminary in-
junction granted by the district court on four grounds. The first is-
sue raised was whether the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction over this case. Neundorfer, Inc. argued that the district
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff
failed to record the transfer of the copyright between Drysdale, Inc.
and Forry, Inc. The court of appeals did acknowledge that 17
U.S.C. § 205(d) requires the owner of a copyright to record the
transfer of the copyright as a jurisdictional prerequisite to an in-
fringement suit. However, since Drysdale, Inc was the registered
owner of the copyright before the merger and also was the surviving
corporation according to the merger agreement, a transfer of the
copyright had not taken place and recordation of the copyright was
not required.
The court next dealt with the defendant's argument that the
Settlement Agreement signed by the parties barred this action. The
agreement contained a mutual release which refered to "any and all
claims, demands or course of action of any nature whatsoever,
whether or not known .... " The court of appeals held that the
general language of the release was not a bar to the plaintiff's pres-
ent suit because Drysdale did not know that Neundorfer, Inc. was
manufacturing AVCs. Furthermore, the court noted that the state
litigation had not involved the same claims as the present suit.
The defendant's third argument challenged the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's copyright notice on the microprocessor chip. The de-
fendant challenged three aspects of the plaintiff's notice.
The defendant asserted that the plaintiff failed to meet the sec-
ond requirement of 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) in order to cure lack of
notice since the plaintiff did not add notice to the copies of the pro-
gram already distributed to the public when the missing notice was
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discovered. The statute states that the lack of notice does not inval-
idate the copyright if (1) the work is registered within five years
after publication without notice and (2) "a reasonable effort is made
to add notice to all copies or phonorecords that are distributed to
the public in the United States after the omission has been discov-
ered." The court of appeals in Forry rejected the defendant's asser-
tion and held that a requirement of adding notice to copies already
distributed would be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the stat-
ute, its legislative history, and holdings in the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits.
The defendant next challenged the form of the plaintiff's no-
tice. The plaintiff had used the symbol "C" in parentheses instead of
"C" in a circle. The statute, 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(1), indicates that
notice "shall consist" of the symbol "©" (the letter C in a circle),
or the word "Copyright", or the abbreviation "Copr." The district
court held that the plaintiff's form of notice "substantially com-
plied" with the statute and was adequate to give notice to the
plaintiff.
The court of appeals in Forty held that since "C" in a hexagon
has been held to be sufficient,5 this issue was a matter which was
more appropriate to determine at trial. It was also noted that since
the plaintiff switched to "C" in a circle, the plaintiff may still be
able to rely on 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) if the "C" in parentheses is
held not to be sufficient notice.
The defendant's final challenge to the sufficiency of the plain-
tiff's notice focused on whether the manner and location of the no-
tice gave "reasonable notice" of the copyright as required by 17
U.S.C. § 401(c). The plaintiff had placed the copyright notice on
the underside of the microprocessor chip so that it was between the
chip and the circuit board. The court of appeals held that the plain-
tiff has a likelihood of success on the issue of reasonable placement
of the notice given the existence of liberal rulings that notice in any
location is sufficient if a would-be infringer would see the notice
prior to copying. In this case, the parties had agreed that copying
of the program could not occur without removal of the chip and
that once the chip was removed, the notice would be visable.
The decision of the Sixth Circuit in Forry is reassuring in that
it furthers a trend of consistency and agreement on the meaning of
"reasonable efforts" to cure lack of notice on a copyrightable work
under 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) of the Copyright Act of 1976. The
5. Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics, 586 F. Supp. 478, 481 (D. Nev. 1984).
1988]
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Forty decision does inject an element of uncertainty into the re-
quired form of a copyright notice in the Sixth Circuit. This is con-
trary to dicta of the Ninth Circuit in Lifshitz which indicated that
allowing defective notice to cure omission of a copyright notice
would go against the legislative intent to encourage the "use of
proper copyright notice'. and that the concept of substantial com-
pliance was no longer relevant under the Copyright Act of 1976.6
Regardless of how the issue of sufficiency of form is resolved, this
decision highlights the critical need for adherance to the mechanics
of the Copyright Act of 1976 in order to reduce the risk of uncer-
tainty in copyright litigation.
Donna Jones
6. Lifshitz, 806 F.2d at 1432-35.
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